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Abstract—Many practical applications, e.g., content based
image retrieval and object recognition, heavily rely on the local
features extracted from the query image. As these local features
are usually exposed to untrustworthy parties, the privacy leakage
problem of image local features has received increasing attention
in recent years. In this work, we thoroughly evaluate the privacy
leakage of Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT), which
is one of the most widely-used image local features. We first
consider the case that the adversary can fully access the SIFT
features, i.e., both the SIFT descriptors and the coordinates are
available. We propose a novel end-to-end, coarse-to-fine deep
generative model for reconstructing the latent image from its
SIFT features. The designed deep generative model consists
of two networks, where the first one attempts to learn the
structural information of the latent image by transforming from
SIFT features to Local Binary Pattern (LBP) features, while
the second one aims to reconstruct the pixel values guided by
the learned LBP. Compared with the state-of-the-art algorithms,
the proposed deep generative model produces much improved
reconstructed results over three public datasets. Furthermore, we
address more challenging cases that only partial SIFT features
(either SIFT descriptors or coordinates) are accessible to the
adversary. It is shown that, if the adversary can only have access
to the SIFT descriptors while not their coordinates, then the
modest success of reconstructing the latent image can be achieved
for highly-structured images (e.g., faces) and would fail in general
settings. In addition, the latent image can be reconstructed with
reasonably good quality solely from the SIFT coordinates. Our
results would suggest that the privacy leakage problem can be
largely avoided if the SIFT coordinates can be well protected.
Index Terms—SIFT, image reconstruction, privacy leakage,
deep generative model
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the most popular algorithms in computer vision
to extract and encode local features, Scale Invariant Feature
Transform (SIFT) [1] has been proven to be very robust against
various distortions [2], [3] and has been widely employed in
many practical scenarios, e.g., content based image retrieval
(CBIR) [4]–[6], object recognition [7], visual tracking [8],
and image matching [9]. Due to its extreme popularity, the
privacy and security issues regarding the SIFT features have
been attracting increasing attention. For instance, in our recent
studies, it was demonstrated that SIFT keypoints can be
maliciously removed and forged with negligible distortions
on the original image, making the decisions from SIFT-based
systems untrustworthy [9], [10].
Noticing that SIFT features are often exposed to untrustwor-
thy parties, we in this work thoroughly evaluate the privacy
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Fig. 1: Reconstruction results of our proposed model on
images of face, wheel, indoor and outdoor scenes. In each
pair, the left is the input SIFT features and the right is the
reconstructed image.
leakage problem of SIFT features. More specifically, we
consider the following two scenarios, where full or partial
SIFT features can be accessed by an adversary:
• Scenario I: Both the SIFT descriptors and their co-
ordinates are accessible to the adversary. For instance,
in 3D point clouds based systems [11]–[14], 3D object
recognition [15] and panoramic image stitching [16],
users need to provide both the SIFT descriptors and the
coordinates, potentially leaking them out.
• Scenario II: Only SIFT descriptors or their coordinates
are accessible to the adversary. For instance, in many
CBIR systems [4]–[6] and copy-move forgery detection
systems [9], [17], [18], it is sufficient to only provide the
SIFT descriptors, while not their coordinates.
In order to evaluate the risk of the information leakage
from SIFT features, we need to know how much information
is carried by them. A feasible solution to this question is to
investigate to what extent the latent image can be recovered
from these SIFT features or local features in general. Along
this line, several approaches [19]–[24] have been devised to
reconstruct the images from local features, mainly under the
assumption of Scenario I, i.e., full features can be accessed.
The pioneer study was conducted by Weinzaepfel et al. [19],
who attempted to reconstruct the image from SIFT features
through patch searching, pasting and smoothing. However, due
to the sparse nature of local descriptors, only some rough
contours can be recovered, while the fine textures are missing.
Angelo et al. [20] later proposed an inverse optimization
framework for recovering the latent image from the local
binary descriptors, without relying on any external databases.
Vondrick et al. [21] addressed the problem of the image recon-
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struction from the histograms of gradient orientations (HOG)
descriptors by using the dictionary representation. Through
estimating the spatial arrangement of local descriptors over
a large-scale image database, Kato et al. [22] presented a
method to reconstruct the image from its Bag-of-Visual-Words
(BoVW) feature. More recently, Desolneux et al. [23] devised
two reconstruction models for HOG features by adopting the
Poisson editing, capable of recovering global shapes and many
geometric details. To further improve the reconstruction per-
formance, there is a recent trend of using deep convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) and generative adversarial networks
(GANs) [24]–[27]. Dosovitskiy and Brox [25] proposed a re-
construction approach from local features through an encoder-
decoder neural network. Wu et al. [26] then improved it
by introducing GANs architecture and a multi-scale features
generation. Further, Pittaluga et al. [27] trained a cascade of U-
Nets with extra convolutional layers to reveal scenes from the
local features. Unfortunately, these methods tend to generate
severe boundary artifacts and distorted structures.
In this work, we first consider the case that the adversary
can fully access the SIFT features (both descriptors and
coordinates), i.e., under Scenario I. We thoroughly evalu-
ate the privacy leakage of SIFT features by constructing a
novel end-to-end, coarse-to-fine image reconstruction model,
SIFT-LBP-Image (SLI), that consists of two networks. The
first network, called LBP reconstruction network, attempts
to learn the structural information of the latent image by
transforming from SIFT features to LBP features, while the
second one aims to reconstruct the pixel values guided by the
learned LBP. Extensive experiments on three publicly available
datasets CelebA-HQ [28], MD-NYU [27] and ImageNet
[29] demonstrate that our proposed model can generate better
results than the state-of-the-art competitors, both quantitatively
and qualitatively (see Fig. 1 for some examples). Furthermore,
we address more challenging cases where only partial SIFT
features are available, i.e., under Scenario II. In the case that
the SIFT coordinates are not accessible, we design two meth-
ods for predicting the missing coordinate information, which
achieve modest success for highly-structured images (e.g.,
faces), while would fail for general settings (e.g., buildings).
The challenge mainly comes from the fact that, for general
cases, there is no strong correlation between the descriptor
and its absolute coordinate, i.e., the extracted descriptor could
be the same regardless the location of the keypoint. We also
evaluate the possibility of reconstructing the latent image
solely from the coordinates. It is found that the rough contour
of the latent image can still be reconstructed, though the
fine textures are missing. Our results would suggest that the
coordinates play a more critical role in ensuring the privacy
of the SIFT features. In other words, if the coordinates of the
SIFT features can be well protected, the sensitive information
leakage can be largely avoided.
Our major contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose SLI, an end-to-end, coarse-to-fine deep gen-
erative model to recover the latent image from its SIFT
features.
• Our model SLI achieves better reconstruction perfor-
mance in comparison with several state-of-the-art meth-
ods [23], [25], [27] over a variety of challenging
datasets including CelebA-HQ [28], MD-NYU [27] and
ImageNet [29].
• We investigate the challenging cases where the adversary
can only access partial SIFT features (either descriptors or
coordinates). To the best of our knowledge, it is the first
work to specifically address the problem of reconstructing
the latent image from the incomplete SIFT features.
We demonstrate that the reconstruction performance is
greatly degraded when coordinates are missing, especially
for those images without regular structures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly reviews the SIFT and LBP algorithms. Section III
presents our proposed model SLI under Scenario I and Section
IV introduces the reconstruction approaches under Scenario
II. Extensive experiments are then given in Section V, and
finally Section VI concludes.
II. INTRODUCTION OF SIFT AND LBP
In this section, we provide a brief introduction of SIFT and
LBP algorithms.
A. SIFT Features Generation and Matching
The detection of SIFT keypoints and the generation of
their corresponding descriptors can be roughly divided into
four steps: i) establishment of scale space; ii) detection and
refinement of extreme points; iii) assignment of dominant
orientation; and iv) generation of descriptors.
At step i), by repeatedly convolving an input image I with
Gaussian filters at different scales, the Gaussian-blurred image
L(x, y, σ) can be computed as
L(x, y, σ) = I(x, y)⊗G(x, y, σ). (1)
Here G(x, y, σ) is the Gaussian kernel at scale σ, i.e.,
G(x, y, σ) =
1
2piσ2
e−(x
2+y2)/2σ2 (2)
At step ii), a series of candidate SIFT keypoints are detected
from the local extrema within a 3×3×3 cube of the Difference
of Gaussians (DoG) domain, where the DoG image at scale
σ is calculated by the difference of adjacent Gaussian-blurred
images
D(x, y, σ) = L(x, y, kσ)− L(x, y, σ), (3)
where k is a predefined constant. In order to reject unstable
extreme points in the DoG domain, a contrast threshold and
an edge threshold are used for keypoints refinement.
At step iii), the orientation of each point (x, y, σ) is defined
as
θ(x, y, σ) = tan−1(
dy
dx
), (4)
where dx and dy are the horizontal and vertical gradients of
(x, y, σ). An orientation histogram is constructed by gathering
the orientation of points in a local window centered at the SIFT
keypoint. The maximum value in the orientation histogram is
assigned as the dominant orientation to guarantee the rotation
invariance.
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Fig. 2: An example of the LBP extraction. Left is the original
3 × 3 neighborhood. Right is the thresholded neighborhood,
and the LBP feature of the centering pixel P is b = 10011011.
At step iv), a 128-dimensional descriptor f is calculated
from the gradient information of 8 directions in a 16 × 16
local area centered at the SIFT keypoint.
Through the above four steps, for the image I, we can
generate a list of n keypoints K = {k1,k2, · · · ,kn} and their
corresponding descriptors F = {f1, f2, · · · , fn}. Specifically,
each SIFT keypoint k is a four-dimensional vector
k = (x, y, σ, θ), (5)
where (x, y) denotes the coordinate of the SIFT keypoint in
the image plane, σ and θ represent the scale and dominant
orientation, respectively. For a given image, its SIFT features
are composed of two parts K and F .
Upon having the SIFT features, a SIFT keypoints matching
algorithm was also suggested in [1]. Specifically, let d =
{d1, d2, · · · , dn−1} record the Euclidean distances between
the descriptor fi and the remaining descriptors {fj} (j 6= i) in
an increasing order, i.e., d1 ≤ d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dn−1. Then a pair
of reliable SIFT match exists if and only if
d1/d2 < t, (6)
where t ∈ (0, 1) is a predefined parameter commonly set as
0.8.
B. Local Binary Pattern (LBP)
LBP is a widely used texture descriptor originally proposed
by Ojala [30]. The LBP features extraction process is to label
each pixel of an image by thresholding its spatial neighbor-
hood. Specifically, to extract the LBP features associated with
the pixel P , we first obtain its M×N neighborhood denoted by
P1, P2, · · · , PMN−1. Then the LBP features associated with
P is a string of binary bits b = b1, b2, · · · , bMN−1. where
bi =
{
0 if Pi ≤ P
1 otherwise
, for i = 1, · · · ,MN − 1. (7)
An example of the LBP features extraction is illustrated in
Fig. 2, where M = N = 3.
LBP features essentially record the relative ordering within
a block of pixels, capturing the information of edges, spots and
other local structures [31]. LBP shows very good performance
in many vision tasks, e.g., unsupervised texture segmentation
[32], face recognition [33], and image reconstruction [34].
III. IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION FROM FULL SIFT
FEATURES
In this section, we consider the problem of reconstructing
the latent image under Scenario I, i.e., full SIFT features
are accessible to the adversary. We first present the architec-
ture of the proposed SIFT-LBP-Image (SLI) deep generative
model, and then give the details on the model optimization.
We experimentally find that the scale σ and the dominant
orientation θ only bring negligible reconstruction performance
gains, and hence, they are abandoned. In other words, the SIFT
descriptors F and the associated coordinates (x, y) are used
as the features map to be injected into SLI.
A. SIFT-LBP-Image (SLI) Model
The architecture of the proposed SIFT-LBP-Image (SLI)
model is illustrated in Fig. 3. As can be seen, SLI is an
end-to-end, coarse-to-fine deep generative model, consisting
of two networks. The first one called LBP reconstruction
network transforms the SIFT features into LBP features,
providing structural information to assist the subsequent image
reconstruction network, which aims to complete the actual
image reconstruction task. One of the reasons why we select
LBP features under this circumstance is that it contains a
great amount of structural information, capable of well guiding
the image reconstruction task. As verified in [34], an image
visually close to the original one could be reconstructed solely
from its LBP features. Also, from the perspective of practical
implementation, LBP is easy to be computed and very few pa-
rameters are involved. More importantly, as expected and will
be verified experimentally, the conversion from SIFT features
to LBP, and eventually to image significantly improves the
reconstruction performance, compared with the challenging
task of reconstructing the latent image directly from its SIFT
features.
Both networks follow an adversarial model [35], i.e., each
network contains a generator based on U-Net architecture [36],
and a discriminator based on the PatchGAN [37]. Let K and F
be the SIFT keypoints and descriptors extracted from an input
image I ∈ RH×W×3 in the grayscale channel. Denote S ∈
RH×W×128 as the input SIFT features map, where descriptors
F are assigned to their corresponding coordinates and zero
vectors elsewhere. At the training stage, the generator of the
LBP reconstruction network G1 : RH×W×128 → RH×W×1
takes S as input, and outputs the estimated LBP Lo. During
this process, the discriminator D1 : RH×W×1 → R works
together with the G1 to produce the result Lo. Upon having
a well-estimated LBP, we then use it to guide the image
reconstruction process in the subsequent network. Specifically,
the generator G2 : RH×W×(128+1) → RH×W×3 takes (S, Lo)
as input, and outputs the final reconstructed result Io, with the
assistance of the discriminator D2 : RH×W×3 → R. At the
testing stage, the procedure is similar, but without the need of
using the two discriminators D1 and D2.
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Fig. 3: Overview of our proposed SIFT-LBP-Image (SLI) reconstruction model. The number above each layer represents the
size of the resolution, while the number below means the dimension.
For the G1 or G2, we adopt a pruned U-Net architecture
[36] composed of an encoder and a decoder. In the encoder,
each layer has a 4×4 convolution, an Instance Norm [38] and a
LeakyReLU [39] with α = 0.2. The decoder has a symmetric
structure, except that the convolution and LeakyReLU are
replaced with the deconvolution and ReLU [40], respectively.
Additionally, skip connections are used to concatenate the
features from each layer of the encoder with the corresponding
layer of the decoder. Experimentally, we find that the dilated
convolutions in the original U-Net architecture [36] bring
negligible improvements to the final reconstruction results. We
hence prune the U-Net architecture by removing the dilated
convolutions, so as to reduce the number of model parameters,
which could speed up the training process. For the D1 or D2,
we adopt the PatchGAN architecture [37].
B. Optimization of the proposed networks
For the optimization of the LBP reconstruction network, we
use the combination of `1 reconstruction loss [41], `2 percep-
tual loss [42] and adversarial loss [43]. More specifically, the
reconstruction loss is naturally defined as:
Lr = ||Lo − Lg||. (8)
The perceptual loss penalizes the reconstructed LBP that is
not perceptually similar to the ground-truth LBP Lg , and it
can be defined as:
Lp =
∑
h∈A
||ϕh([Lo,Lo,Lo])− ϕh([Lg,Lg,Lg])||2, (9)
where ϕh is the activation map corresponding to the h-th layer
of an ImageNet-pretrained VGG-16 network. The set A is
formed by the layer indexes of conv2 1, conv3 1, conv4 1
layers. Here we concatenate three Lo or Lg as the input of
layers in set A because VGG-16 fixes the input as three
channels. Also, the Relativistic average GAN (RaGAN) [43]
can be calculated as follows:
LD1 = −ELg
[
log
(
D˜(Lg)
)]− ELo[log(1− D˜(Lo))], (10)
LG1 = −ELo
[
log
(
D˜(Lo)
)]− ELg[log(1− D˜(Lg))], (11)
where
D˜(Lg) = sigmoid
(
D1(Lg)− ELo [D1(Lo)]
)
, (12)
D˜(Lo) = sigmoid
(
D1(Lo)− ELg [D1(Lg)]
)
. (13)
Finally, the loss functions for the LBP reconstruction network
are defined by integrating the above three types of loss:
LLBPG1 = λrLr + λpLp + λgLG1 , (14)
LLBPD1 = LD1 , (15)
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where λr, λp and λa are the parameters trading off different
types of loss, whose settings will be clarified in Section V.
For the loss function of the image reconstruction network,
we similarly adopt the combination of `1 reconstruction loss,
`2 perceptual loss and adversarial loss. Besides, to better
optimize the high-level features of the image reconstruction
network, we further introduce the style loss [44], which is
used to measure the differences between the covariances of
the activation maps. This is an effective strategy to eliminate
the “checkerboard” artifacts caused by deconvolution layers
[45]. Typically, the style loss can be defined as:
Ls =
∑
h∈A
||Gϕh(Io)−Gϕh(Ig)||2, (16)
where Gϕh is a 3 × 3 Gram matrix constructed from the
activation map ϕh.
Finally, the loss functions for the image reconstruction
network can be computed as:
LIMGG2 =λsLs+
λr||Io − Ig||+
λp
∑
h∈A
||ϕh(Io)− ϕh(Ig)||2−
λg
[
EIo
[
log
(
D˜(Io)
)]
+ EIg
[
log
(
1− D˜(Ig)
)]]
,
(17)
LIMGD2 = −EIg
[
log
(
D˜(Ig)
)]− EIo[log(1− D˜(Io))], (18)
where
D˜(Ig) = sigmoid
(
D2(Ig)− EIo [D2(Io)]
)
, (19)
D˜(Io) = sigmoid
(
D2(Io)− EIg [D2(Ig)]
)
. (20)
To stabilize the training process and alleviate the gradient
vanishing problem, we first train the generator G1 and the
discriminator D1 in the LBP network. Then we concatenate
G1 to the image reconstruction network, and perform an end-
to-end training over G1, G2 and D2 simultaneously. Here,
Adam [46] algorithm is adopted.
We would also like to emphasize that we need to have access
to the full SIFT features (both descriptors and coordinates) to
train and use the SLI deep model. As mentioned previously, in
many practical applications such as CBIR, the assumption on
the availability of the full SIFT features is not valid, namely,
the adversary can only access partial SIFT features: either
descriptors or coordinates. In the next Section, we will tackle
this challenge of reconstructing the latent image from partial
SIFT features.
IV. IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION FROM PARTIAL SIFT
FEATURES
Since the SIFT features of a given image consist of a
set of descriptors and coordinates, we consider two cases of
partial SIFT features, namely, 1) absence of coordinates and 2)
absence of descriptors. In the following, we discuss the latent
image reconstruction for these two cases separately.
A. Absence of Coordinates
Clearly, SIFT descriptors without the corresponding co-
ordinates cannot be directly used as model input of the
proposed SLI presented in Section III. A natural solution to
this problem is to somehow estimate the coordinates of these
SIFT descriptors, and then the deep generative model SLI
can be applied. It should be pointed out that estimating the
coordinates from the SIFT descriptors is a very challenging
(if possible) problem in general settings, as SIFT descriptors
could appear anywhere in an image if it is captured in different
angles. In other words, for genetic images, the correlation
between the SIFT descriptors and the coordinates is actually
quite weak. The only hope for relatively accurate estimation
of coordinates from SIFT descriptors exists for some highly-
structured images, e.g., face images. Specifically, we propose
two methods: reference-based and landmark-based approaches
for the estimation of coordinates from SIFT descriptors, as
demonstrated in Fig. 4.
1) Reference-based Method: Since it is very challenging
to accurately model the relationship between SIFT descriptors
and coordinates from one given image, we build up a reference
dataset attempting to provide some prior knowledge. Let
F = {f1, f2, · · · , fn} be the given SIFT descriptors. For each
SIFT descriptor in F , the straightforward idea is to find the
most similar descriptor from the reference dataset using a
nearest neighbor (NN) algorithm, and then take its coordinate
as the estimated one. Let R = {Iˆ1, Iˆ2, · · · , IˆN} be the
reference dataset randomly sampled from the training set. Let
also Fˆj = {fˆ j1 , fˆ j2 , · · · } be the set of SIFT descriptors extracted
from image Iˆj at coordinates {(xj1, yj1), (xj2, yj2), · · · }. Define
Fˆ as the set recording all the SIFT descriptors, namely,
Fˆ =
⋃
Fˆj , j = 1, · · · , N. (21)
Then the coordinate of fi ∈ F can be estimated by using the
following NN algorithm:
(xi, yi) = c(fˆj) (22)
where
fˆj = arg min
fˆj∈Fˆ
d(fi, fˆj) (23)
Here, d(·) computes the Euclidean distance of two descriptors
and c(·) returns the coordinate of the input descriptor. Also,
the reason why we use the NN algorithm rather than the SIFT
matching algorithm is that, in most cases, the input and the
reference image do not contain identical objects, making it
almost impossible to find a matching pair. In the cases when
multiple descriptors are projected to the same coordinate, we
randomly keep one descriptor.
This straightforward method can find the globally most
similar SIFT descriptors from the reference dataset; however,
the recovered features map cannot guarantee the existence
of stable object contours, mainly because these coordinates
could be obtained from multiple reference images. To mitigate
the aforementioned drawback, we propose to use the NN
algorithm at the image level instead of the descriptor level.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4: Framework of reference-based (a) and landmark-based (b) methods for coordinates estimation. The number below each
layer of the SIFT classifier means the dimension.
That is, for the whole set of descriptors F , we first find one
reference Fˆ∗ with the minimum average distances, and then
project each descriptor in F onto the coordinates of the nearest
descriptor within Fˆ∗. Mathematically,
Fˆ∗ = argmin
Fˆj
D(F , Fˆj), j = 1, · · · , N, (24)
where
D(F , Fˆj) = 1
n
∑
i
min
fˆj
(d(fi, fˆj)), fi ∈ F , fˆj ∈ Fˆj . (25)
Upon having Fˆ∗, the coordinate of fi ∈ F can be similarly
estimated as (22) and (23) by replacing Fˆ in (23) with Fˆ∗.
We now explain how to form the reference dataset R,
which is related to the training set for the deep generative
model SLI. In this work, we consider three publicly available
datasets CelebA-HQ [28], MD-NYU [27] and ImageNet
[29]. CelebA-HQ has only one category consisting of face
images; MD-NYU has two categories: buildings scenes and
indoor scenes; and ImageNet [29] is much more diverse
with one thousand categories. For a given dataset, R is formed
by randomly picking one image from each category. For
instance, R contains only one face image when CelebA-HQ
is used, while R becomes a set with 1000 images in the case
of ImageNet. We also have tried to increase the number
of images picked from each category, but found that the
improvements on the reconstructed images are very slight.
2) Landmark-based Method: The second method called
landmark-based method only works for face images. Specif-
ically, we train a classifier to roughly classify the SIFT
descriptors into several pre-defined categories corresponding
to different face regions, and then recover the coordinates. The
schematic diagram of the landmark-based method is given in
Fig. 4 (b). At the training stage, we firstly use Dlib [47] to
extract landmarks, and then classify the landmarks into seven
categories: jaw, right/left brow, nose, right/left eye, mouth
(labeled from 0 to 6 respectively). Formally, for a given face
image I, Dlib can detect its landmarks M = {(xi, yi)|i ∈
[0, 67]}, where each coordinate represents a location of the
facial region. For instance, the indexes R0 = [0, 16] means
jaw region and R1 = [17, 21], R2 = [22, 26], R3 = [27, 34],
R4 = [35, 41], R5 = [42, 48], R6 = [48, 68] indicate right/left
brow, nose, right/left eye and mouth regions respectively.
Then, for each SIFT descriptor, we search the landmark using
minimum Euclidean distance and assign the corresponding
label to it. In the case that the minimum Euclidean distance is
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larger than 10, then another label 7 is assigned, which means
that this SIFT descriptor belongs to the “other” category (i.e.,
non-facial region).
Upon having the pairs of SIFT descriptor and its label, we
train a classifier C : R1×128 → R1×8 to classify the SIFT
descriptors into the aforementioned 8 categories. The classifier
C consists of six fully connected layers, where each layer is
composed of a linear layer, a Batch Norm [48] and a ReLU
in a sequential manner. For optimization, we adopt the widely
used cross entropy loss,
Le = −
7∑
c=0
yclog(C(f)c), (26)
where C(f)c means the probability that the input descriptor f
belongs to the category c, and yc is 1 if the category is the same
as the sample category; otherwise 0. In the training process,
we randomly select one thousand image (around 120,000 SIFT
descriptors) from CelebA-HQ.
Next, by using the landmark Mˆ = {(xˆi, yˆi)} from an image
Iˆ of the training set as prior knowledge, we can generate
coordinates (xˆi + , yˆi + ), i ∈ Rc for each input SIFT
descriptor according to its predicted label c, where a randomly
generated integer  ∈ [−3, 3] is added to reduce collisions. It
should be noted that if the predicted label is 7, we simply
discard this SIFT descriptor as it does not belong to any
specific facial regions.
B. Absence of Descriptors
We now investigate another scenario of partial SIFT features
where the SIFT descriptors are missing while the coordinates
of SIFT keypoints are available to the adversary. For instance,
SIFT keypoints could be used as robust reference points, in
which case the coordinates changes are employed to rectify
a distorted image [49]. It was also demonstrated that SIFT
coordinates can be used for image quality assessment [50],
[51]. The scenario with absence of descriptors has been largely
neglected by the existing works [19], [25]–[27], which mainly
focused on how the descriptors leak the information of the
latent image. If fact, given the set of SIFT coordinates, it
is a much less-challenging task to recover the latent image,
compared with the case of lacking coordinates. Specifically,
we first transform the coordinates into a binary feature map,
where 1’s are assigned to the locations with SIFT keypoint and
0’s elsewhere. This binary feature map can be readily used as
input to the second network of our proposed deep generative
model SLI, and the first LBP reconstruction network is simply
disabled. In addition, the first layer of the generator G2 needs
to be modified as one channel G′2 : RH×W×1 → RH×W×3,
so as to fit the dimension of the binary feature map. The other
modules of SLI keep unchanged.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed deep generative model SLI is implemented
using PyTorch framework. The training is performed on a
desktop equipped with a Core-i7 and a single GTX 2080
GPU. The parameters in Adam are β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.999
and learning rate r = 1 × 10−4. We train the model with
the batch size of 1 and the parameters trading off different
terms in the loss functions are fixed to be λr = 100,
λp = 1, λs = 10 and λa = 0.2. To embrace the concept
of reproducible research, the code of our paper is available at:
https://github.com/HighwayWu/SIFT-Reconstruction.
We evaluate the reconstruction performance of our method
over three publicly available datasets: a high-quality human
face dataset CelebA-HQ [28], a 3D point cloud dataset
containing different indoor and outdoor scenes MD-NYU [27]
and a large visualization dataset with one thousand category
ImageNet [29]. The CelebA-HQ dataset contains 28,000
training images and 2000 testing images. The MD-NYU dataset
has 8192 images in the training set and 1024 images in the
testing set. The ImageNet dataset includes over 1.2 million
training images and 100,000 testing images.
A. Evaluations under Scenario I
We first compare the image reconstruction performance
of different algorithms under Scenario I. For comparison
purpose, we adopt three state-of-the-art SIFT-based image re-
construction methods: Stochastic Image Reconstruction (SIR)
[23], Inverting Visual Representations (IVR) [25], and Reveal-
ing Scenes by Inverting (INV) [27]. Fig. 5 shows the recon-
struction results for some representative testing images. As can
be observed, SIR [23] can restore the main semantic informa-
tion where the SIFT keypoints exist, whereas the areas with
insufficient number of SIFT keypoints cannot be recovered
satisfactorily. In addition, the reconstructed images lose all
the color information. This is because SIR is based on Poisson
editing rather than neural networks with training datasets. IVR
[25] can reconstruct much more realistic color images by using
CNNs. However, the reconstructed contents are highly blurry
and many fine details are missing. Furthermore, even though
INV [27] can produce pretty good results by adopting a deep
GAN-based neural network, some broken or blurred textures
can be observed. Compared with these methods, our proposed
model can learn more reasonable structures and generate more
realistic reconstructions, especially those fine structures and
texture regions.
In addition to the visual comparison of the reconstructed
images, we also compare different methods quantitatively, as
shown in Table I. Here, we adopt the commonly used metrics,
namely, structural similarity index (SSIM), peak signal-to-
noise ratio (PSNR) and Frechet Inception Distance (FID)
[52]. SSIM and PSNR are the most widely used objective
measurements of the image quality; however, they may assign
inappropriate scores to perceptually accurate results [53].
Therefore, FID is often introduced to reflect the Wasserstein-
2 distance between the feature space representations of real
and generated images using a pre-trained Inception-V3 model
[54]. It can be seen that our method consistently outperforms
the competing algorithms under all these three criteria.
Beyond the above traditional metrics for quantitative com-
parisons, we propose an additional metric by evaluating the
percentage of re-matching (for short, PRM) between the
ground truth SIFT descriptors and ones from the reconstructed
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TABLE I: Quantitative comparison of different reconstruction methods over CelebA-HQ, MD-NYU and ImageNet among
SIR [23], IVR [25], INV [27] and our proposed model SLI. −Lower is better. +Higher is better.
Methods CelebA-HQ MD-NYU ImageNet
FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%) FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%) FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%)
SIR [23] 230.5 0.547 14.12 18.13 305.5 0.271 11.18 2.08 325.0 0.325 12.77 3.18
IVR [25] 143.5 0.540 17.62 25.79 363.5 0.305 13.55 1.82 294.8 0.308 14.21 8.27
INV [27] 73.5 0.641 17.11 28.78 136.4 0.478 13.91 8.11 189.7 0.482 15.11 29.47
SLI (Ours) 22.6 0.670 18.95 31.71 119.1 0.485 14.81 10.49 173.4 0.513 15.80 35.92
(a) GT. (b) Input (c) SIR [23] (d) IVR [25] (e) INV [27] (f) SLI (Ours)
Fig. 5: Qualitative comparison of different reconstruction methods over CelebA-HQ , MD-NYU and ImageNet. For each
row, the images from left to right are ground truth, input SIFT features map, results generated by SIR [23], IVR [25], INV
[27] and the proposed model SLI, respectively.
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(a) GT. (b) In. (25%) (c) Res. (25%) (d) In. (50%) (e) Res. (50%) (f) In. (75%) (g) Res. (75%) (h) In. (100%) (i) Res.(100%)
Fig. 7: Robustness evaluation by using different percentage of SIFT features as input. (b), (d), (f), (h) are the input SIFT features
map with 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of the original SIFT features, and (c), (e), (g), (i) are corresponding reconstruction results.
Fig. 6: Re-matching examples. In each pair, left is the ground
truth and right is the reconstruction result. Green lines repre-
sent matched SIFT pairs.
results. This reflects how the reconstructed image preserves
the fidelity of the latent image in the SIFT descriptor domain.
More specifically, define Fg = {fg1 , fg2 , · · · , fgm} as the set of
ground truth descriptors, and Fo = {fo1 , fo2 , · · · , fon} as the set
of reconstructed ones. Let di,1 and di,2 record the nearest and
second-nearest Euclidean distances between the reconstructed
descriptor foi (i ∈ [1, n]) and the ground truth descriptors
{fgj |j ∈ [1,m]}. Then the PRM is defined as:
PRM =
1
n
n∑
i=1
T (di,1/di,2, t), (27)
where T is a thresholding function incorporating the SIFT
matching algorithm [1],
T (di,1/di,2, t) =
{
1 if di,1/di,2 < t
0 if di,1/di,2 ≥ t
. (28)
Here, t is set to 0.8 for guaranteeing the reliable matching
according to [1]. Obviously, PRM takes a value in [0, 1],
representing the fidelity of the SIFT descriptors extracted
from the reconstructed image. The PRM results of different
methods are also compiled into Table I. As can be seen, the
proposed SLI achieves the best PRM performance among all
the competing algorithms over three test datasets. Re-matching
examples are also given in Fig. 6, where the green lines
represent the matched SIFT pairs and the remaining isolated
points indicate no match.
(a) GT. (b) wo (c) w Edge (d) w RTV (e) w LBP
Fig. 8: Effect of the guidance provided by different structures.
(a) Input and ground truth. (b)-(e) The first and third rows
show the inputs with empty, predicted Canny edges [55], RTV
[56] and LBP [30], respectively; the second and fourth rows
present the corresponding reconstructed results.
Before ending the discussions under Scenario I, we evaluate
the robustness of our proposed SLI. Fig. 7 shows the results
of randomly using 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% SIFT features
as the model input. Although the input has very high spatial
sparsity (e.g., 25% or 50% features), the output images are
still quite interpretable. These results indicate that the privacy
leakage problem is very severe under Scenario I, as only a
small portion of the SIFT features could lead to the disclosure
of sensitive information.
B. Ablation Studies of SLI
We now conduct the ablation studies of our proposed SLI
by analyzing how the LBP reconstruction network contributes
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TABLE II: Quantitative comparisons of the guidance provided
by Canny edge [55], RTV [56] and LBP [30] respectively.
−Lower is better. +Higher is better.
Methods CelebA-HQ
FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%)
wo 42.5 0.591 17.58 20.84
w Edge 27.9 0.634 18.55 29.26
w RTV 33.8 0.605 17.89 26.19
w LBP 22.6 0.670 18.95 31.71
Methods MD-NYU
FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%)
wo 213.3 0.398 13.49 5.34
w Edge 149.0 0.451 14.44 6.82
w RTV 200.7 0.408 13.89 5.84
w LBP 119.1 0.485 14.81 10.49
to the final reconstruction. To this end, we retrain the model
without the assistance of the LBP reconstruction network. Fur-
ther, we consider to replace the LBP reconstruction network
with some alternatives including the Canny edges [55] and
RTV [56], which could also offer structural information for
the image reconstruction [53], [57].
The reconstruction results produced with different structural
information are demonstrated in Fig. 8. In many cases, the
SIFT keypoints are poorly localized along an edge [1], or
are too dense to be separated from the edge, making the
transform from SIFT to edges inaccurate (e.g., the transformed
edges in the first and third rows). Although RTV is a good
representation of the global structures, the high-frequency in-
formation discarded by RTV results in unsatisfactory outputs.
Meanwhile, from the perspective of the practical implementa-
tion, Canny edges and RTV extractions typically involve many
parameters (e.g., the pre-filtering strength, the threshold for
Canny edges, and the degree of smooth/sharpness for RTV),
whose optimal setting should vary for different images. In con-
trast, LBP is easy to be computed and could be parameter-free.
Also, the sufficient information (e.g., gradients) contained in
LBP guides the learning direction better and makes the result
sharper (e.g., eyes and nose), which could be further validated
by the statistical reports in Table II. These observations would
suggest that LBP is a more appropriate candidate for providing
structural information in the case of image reconstruction from
SIFT features.
C. Evaluations under Scenario II
We now evaluate the performance of the image recon-
struction from SIFT features under Scenario II, i.e., either
absence of coordinates or absence of descriptors. We first try
to reconstruct the image by using solely SIFT descriptors as
input, in which case the coordinates can be estimated through
the reference-based and landmark-based methods presented in
Section IV. The reconstruction results are illustrated in Fig.
9. For simplicity, we call the SLI model with coordinates
estimated by the reference-based and landmark-based methods
SLI-R and SLI-L, respectively. As can be observed, SLI-L can
restore the main semantic information of the facial area, but the
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Fig. 9: Image reconstruction from solely SIFT descriptors. (a)
Ground truth. (b)-(c) Inputs and results of SLI-L. (d)-(e) Inputs
and results of SLI-R. (f)-(g) Results of SLI with full SIFT
features for comparison.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 10: Image reconstruction from solely SIFT coordinates.
(a) Ground truth. (b)-(c) Inputs (binary map) and correspond-
ing results. (d)-(e) Results of SLI with full SIFT features for
comparison.
results are quite blurry. In contrast, SLI-R can generate sharper
and more realistic reconstruction results, primarily thanks to
the employment of a reference image. However, both SLI-
L and SLI-R have a fatal problem, i.e., choosing a suitable
landmark or reference is a crucial issue. As the data included in
CelebA-HQ usually have the same skeleton (e.g., eyes, nose
and mouth), we can easily project the input descriptors to the
corresponding positions in the landmark or reference, while for
the dataset (e.g., MD-NYU or ImageNet) that usually contains
various categories, it is difficult to find one or more suitable
images as the skeleton of SIFT descriptors. As also mentioned
in Section IV, SLI-L and SLI-R could fail for generic images
without regular structures. The last row of Fig. 9 shows an
example of such failure. Besides, the quantitative comparison
of SLI-L and SLI-R are reported in Table III. It is found that
SLI-R performs much better than SLI-L with 0.9 dB PSNR
gain over CelebA-HQ. Also, as expected, they both perform
poorly in the other datasets.
We then evaluate how much information can be recon-
structed from solely SIFT coordinates. Although SIFT coordi-
nates are located in key regions of the image, they can only be
represented as a binary map without specific image details. For
the reconstruction result of using the binary map as the model
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TABLE III: Quantitative comparison of the image reconstruction using solely SIFT descriptors or coordinates (binary map)
over CelebA-HQ, MD-NYU and ImageNet. −Lower is better. +Higher is better.
Methods CelebA-HQ MD-NYU ImageNet
FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%) FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%) FID− SSIM+ PSNR+ PRM+(%)
SLI-L 181.0 0.372 13.70 13.52 - - - - - - - -
SLI-R 148.4 0.397 14.60 15.01 333.5 0.292 12.40 0.00 447.5 0.233 11.87 0.00
Coordinates 122.4 0.449 13.88 14.43 243.8 0.238 12.33 1.19 440.3 0.234 11.80 0.00
SLI 22.6 0.670 18.95 31.71 119.1 0.485 14.81 10.49 173.4 0.513 15.80 35.92
input, a naive expectation is that the edge information can be
well restored. Surprisingly, however, as shown in Fig. 10, the
basic contours and contents of the objects in the image can be
recovered, even though the lack of descriptors leads to blurred
textures. The statistical results of the reconstructed images are
also compiled into Table III. Compared with SLI-L and SLI-R,
the reconstruction results from coordinates are slightly better.
This validates the conclusion that the privacy leakage is not
only through the descriptors, but also the coordinates.
The above results also imply that the privacy leakage
problem is much less severe under Scenario II than the cases
under Scenario I , especially when the adversary cannot access
the coordinates.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have thoroughly investigated the privacy
leakage problem of the widely-used SIFT features. We have
first considered the Scenario I, where the adversary can fully
access the SIFT features. We have proposed a deep generative
model SLI for reconstructing the latent image from its SIFT
features. The proposed model has been formed with two net-
works: a LBP reconstruction network, which aims to convert
the SIFT into LBP features, and an image reconstruction
network, which generates the reconstruction results by using
the transformed LBP as a guidance. We then have considered
the Scenario II, where the adversary can only access the
partial SIFT features. We have designed landmark-based and
reference-based methods for estimating SIFT coordinates from
the descriptors. Experimental results have been provided to
demonstrate the superiority of the proposed model SLI under
these two scenarios. Our results also have suggested that
the privacy leakage problem can be largely avoided under
Scenario II, especially when the adversary cannot access the
coordinates.
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